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It is the purpose of this study to present a story of the United
States-Argentine relations in connection with the "Good Neighbor" foreign
policy of the United States from 1933 to 1944. The writer endeavors to
treat the subject during the long period of Roosevelt-Hull administration.
Since, under our Constitution, the President is responsible for the admin
istration of the foreign policy, the President and Secretary of State will
be mentioned jointly in connection with the initiation, supplementation,
and developments of that policy.
The study is filled with potentialities because of the fact that
scholars have been more or less concerned with other aspeots of the Roose
velt foreign policies during the period. Therefore, there is a great oppor
tunity for anyone who is interested and who wishes to make a real contribu
tion to American history.
The data for this paper, which originate from primary sources -
memoirs, public documents, speeches, legislative proceedings - and support
ing secondary works, is arranged in chronological order so as to present a
fairly simple narrative. The sources used are sufficient to supply the ba
sic facts upon which the narrative is written. However, there is not enough
material available which treats tiie subject from the Argentine point of view.
In this respect, the writer has attempted to treat the subject as objective
ly as possible, considering the purely United States point of view as ex
pressed in most of the sources used.
In discussing the American neighborhood in 1933, the writer at-
ii
tempts to give a brief background of Latin-American relations during the
period immediately preceding the period of the paper proper. This is done
to help the reader interpret the events that follow in the rest of the
work. The important developments from the Montevideo Conference of 1933
to the Conference of Mexico City in 1945 are discussed to show the gener
al attitude of Argentina toward the Good neighbor policy of Franklin Roose
velt, how that nation did not readily accept the American ideas of inter-
American cooperation, and how she remained pro-Axis in spite of pressure
from the United States and other American nations*
The material is arranged in four chapters. An attempt has been
made in this arrangement to follow the events in logical and chronological
order. A summary followed by a bibliography appear at the end of chapter
four.
The writer gratefully acknowledges the advice and criticism of
Professor C. A. Bacote, Department of History, Atlanta University, and Dr.
William M. Boyd, Department of Political Scienoe of the same institution.
H. D. W.
CHAPTER I
TEE AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOOD IN 1933
The general attitude existing among the American nations in 1933
was anything but cordial. The animosities were deeply rooted in the activ
ities of the United States during the years from 1900 to 1930. The differ
ences of opinions were not alone between the United States on the one hand
and the Latin American countries on the other, but among the Latin American
states themselves. However, in this disquisition we shall be concerned
primarily with the obstacles, disagreements, and clashes between the United
States and that great South American Republic - Argentina.
Argentina is the chief nation of South America. In population,
it is second to Brazil. Its national income per capita is higher than
that of any other Spanish speaking country in the Americas. The Argentine
nation also takes the lead in educational and scientific developments. Its
capital city, Buenos Aires, has no equal among the other Latin American ci-
1
ties.
Argentina's historic position of opposition to the United States
has been noted by many historians. The following description of the Argen
tine attitude toward inter-American agreements is typical:
. . . Argentina has been a chronic off-key note in whatever
hemisphere harmony has materialized in the past twenty years.
Only six per cent of approximately ninety inter-American agree-
have been ratified. Open and unbridled opposition to the Mon
roe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism has been shown on every occa
sion - chiefly because they have been suspeeted as instruments
1Clarence H. Haring, Argentina and the United States (Boston,
1940), p. 7.
of United States tutelage and because Argentina views herself
as the natural, rightful leader of Pan-Americanismi If the Ar
gentine Republic has not been able to defeat the leadership of
the United States, it has refused to cooperate with it.
The writer has no intention of proving whether the United States
Government is or is not responsible for the suspicion rampant among its La
tin American neighbors in 1933, but a look into the immediate past will
show that ttie now chief exponent of the "Good Neighbor" policy has not al
ways lived up to the virtues conducive to that policy. Perhaps, in the
final analysis, there will be some justification in the fact that Argenti
na could not forgive and forget as early as her other Latin American sis
ters.
At the close of the Spanish-American War, the United States en
tered a very aggressive period of economic and political expansion. The
©utoome of the war resulted in the United States becoming a world power
with possession of the Philippines and Puert© Rie©, and the responsibili
ty for Cuba. The United States moved int® the Caribbean area and dominat
ed the shores of the Gulf to the extent deemed necessary t© prevent the
3
domination of this area by any other strong power.
The Caribbean policy of President Theodore Roosevelt was very
aggressive and ruthless. The Monroe doetrine as originally understood
proposed to regulate the conduct of Europe with reference to Latin Ameri
ca, but after 1904 it was used to justify the United States' regulation
4
of the oonduct of Latin America with respect to Europe.
2Lawrence H. Chamberlain and Richard C. Snyder, American Foreign
Policy (Hew York, 1948), p. 713.
3J. Fred Rippy, Latinj^merj^Jj^World^ Politics (New York, 1938),
p. 278.
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of jthe American People,
(3rd. ed., Hew York, 1947), p. 551.
... Theodore Roosevelt confused the Latin-American
policy of the United States by identifying intervention
in the Dominican Republic with the Monroe Doctrine, thus
making that Doctrine which had said "hands off11 to Europe,
seem to say "hands on" for the United States.
The United States forced the Platt amendment upon Cuba and there
by reduced that country to the status of a protectorate, acquired the Pana
ma Canal by encouraging the secession of Panama from Colombia, established
a protectorate over the new state of Panama, took charge of the customs of
the Dominican Republic and subjected its finances to rigorous United States
control. President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed his Corollary of the Mon
roe Doetrine which threatened the other Latin American nations unless they
maintained domestic order and lived up to their financial obligations to
foreigners. AH the countries of Central America were denied the right
6
of revolution.
Argentina, although far removed from the Caribbean area, watched
the developments attentively, and took the lead in speaking out against
these "strong arm" actions of the "Colossus of the North." On December 3,
1901, President Roosevelt speaking to a joint session of the United States
Congress intimated that armed force could be used by a nation to collect
debts from another. He was promptly answered by Foreign Minister Louis M.
Drago of Argentina. Drago issued his famous statement that public loans
could not occasion armed intervemtion nor even the actual occupation of
p
territory. Argentina was successful in having this Drago Doctrine adopted
Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States
(New York, 1943), p. 157.
g
Rippy, op. oit., p. 279.
7Ibid.
8Chester L. Jones and others, The United Spates and the Caribbean
(Chicago, 1934), p. 36.
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at an international convention at the Hague Conference in 1907. The first
outcry against intervention was heard around the world.
President William Howard Taft considered it a most useful func
tion of the armed forces to proteot the big business investments of Amer
ican citizens in foreign countries. Taft, in discussing "dollar diplom
acy" in May, 1910, said:
... The theory that the field of diplomacy does not in
clude in any degree commerce and the increase of trade rela
tions is one to which Mr. Knox (the Secretary of State) and
this administration do not subscribe. We believe it to be of
the utmost importance that while our foreign policy should
not be turned a hair's breadth from the straight path of jus
tice, it may be well made to include active intervention to
secure for our merchandise and our capitalists opportunity
for profitable investment which shall insure to the benefit
of both countries concerned. . .
Woodrow Wilson's policies were simply a continuation of those of
his predecessors. Wilson, under his dootrine of constitutionalism, also
denied the right of revolution to all of Latin America. However, he did
not offer vigorous protection to American lives and properly in foreign
countries. Mexican bandits under General Villa killed sixteen young Amer
ican engineers as they stepped off a passenger train at Santa Ysabel, Mex
ico. Congress passed a resolution in March, 1916, for armed intervention
to proteot American citizens, but the president accepted the worthless
promise of the recognized Mexican Government to punish the murderers. It
was only after Mexican bandits invaded the states of New Mexico and Texas
that the president ordered American troops to cross the border into Mexico.
The outcry against intervention, which started wiiii the Drago Doc
trine and quieted down during the World War, broke out again during the 1920's
Q
Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft
(New York, 1939), II, p. 678.
10
Rippy, op. oit., p. 280,
11
under the Republican administrations of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover.
Pressure on the United States both at home and abroad had been continuous
since the war. There were two Pan-American Conventions held during the
1920's, and at each the Latin American countries tried to air their griev-
12
ances, but United States influence prevented the attempts.
The United States had been successful in blocking every attempt
on the part of twenty Latin American Republics to debate live questions at
the inter-Amerioan conferences. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes
held off an Argentine effort to inject intervention and tariff questions
formally into the program of the Havana Conference of February, 1928. The
attempt on the part of Argentina to inject these topics had much to do with
the failure of that conference. If given a chance to discuss these ques
tions, the Argentine delegation would have killed the whole Pan-American
13
idea, and this is perhaps what they wanted. The chief of the Argentine
delegation, Honorio Pueyrredon, bolted the conference and resigned his posi
tion as Ambassador to the United States when the conference refused to con
sider tariff reforms. The whole Argentine nation objected to the features
of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, passed by the United States Congress in
1922, because it tended to cut off from United States markets major Argen-
14
tine exports, especially food products.
The Latin American countries were not permitted to discuss the in
tervention and tariff questions but succeeded in securing a reorganization




Bemis, op. cit., p. 264.
14
Mary W. Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America
(New York, 1945), p. 737.
of the Pan-American Union somewhat more favorable to their desires. They
were also successful in securing a declaration against aggression, and a
resolution providing for an arbitration conference to be held in Washing
ton in 1928 (December 28 to January 5, 1929).
The Washington Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration met as
scheduled. The Conference formulated two treaties, one on conciliation
and another on arbitration. The Conference also created a commission of
neutrals to conciliate the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. The
commission was composed of representatives of the United States, Cuba, Co-
16
lombia, Mexico and Uruguqy. The Argentine Republic did not send repre
sentatives. "... Absence of Argentina at the Special Washington Confer
ence of 1928-1929 had excluded its government unexpectedly from an import-
ant peace maneuver.
Public opinion caused the United States Government to become
more conciliatory toward the Latin American neighbors during the latter
part of the long Republican era of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. During
this period the denial of the right of revolution was made to apply only
to the Central American area; the property of Americans in Latin America
was protected with less vigor and the Roosevelt Corollary was quietly re
nounced. The United Spates Marines were withdrawn from the Dominican Re
public and Nicaragua,18 These changes in many respects marked the beginning
of the "Good Neighbor" policy of Franklin Roosevelt.
15Rippy, op. cit., pp. 254-255.
16
Bemis, op. eit._» p. 265.
17IMcU-. •
18Rippy, op. cit., p. 283.
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The year 1933 marked the end of the long Republican rule and the
beginning of the Democratic Party's long tenure. A change in parties, at
the time, also brought changes in foreign policies. Franklin Roosevelt was
inaugurated President of the United States on March 4, 1933, at a time when
the relations between the United States and the Latin American countries
were anything but cordial. All of Latin America had learned to fear and
distrust the "Colossus of the North," Even though domestic affairs demand
ed immediate attention because of the great depression, the president must
have sensed the Latin American anxiety when in his inaugural address he stat
ed s
. '. , In the field of world policy I would dedicate this
nation to the policy of the good neighbor - the neighbor who
resolutely respects himself and, because he does, respects
the rights of others - the neighbor who respects his obliga
tions and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with
a world of neighbors.^
Much of President Roosevelt's success in foreign affairs was due
to his selection of competent men for the State Department. The new Secre
tary of State, Cordell Hull, in turn selected experienced, professional ad
visers. Sumner Welles was appointed Assistant Secretary of State in charge
of Latin American affairs. He was later made Ambassador to Cuba. The pres
ident continued to stress the need and benefits to he derived from the good
neighbor policy, Tflhile speaking in Havana, Cuba, before the Pan American Un
ion, April 14, 1933, on the occasion of Pan American Day, he said:
. • .Hever have the need and benefits of neighborly cooper
ation in every form of human activity been so evident as they
are today. The essential qualities of Pan-Americanism must be
the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely mu-
I, Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin
D, Roosevelt (New York, 1938), II, p, 14,
20Ibid., p. 130.
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tual understanding and, through such understanding, a
sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view.
It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up
a system of which confidence, friendship, and good
will are the corner-stones.20
That the president's utterances were winning the confidence of
the Latin American nations is admitted but this change of attitude on the
part of the Latin Americans could not be accomplished overnight. This
fact is substantiated by an inoident in Mexico during the same month*
There was considerable murmuring in Mexico against the appointment of
2l
Josephus Daniels as United States Ambassador to Mexico. These murmur-
ings were so loud that Mexican Foreign Minister Casauranc felt that an of
ficial denial that the appointment of Daniels was in any way displeasing
to the Mexican Government was needed* The foreign minister's statement
follows*
... Various badly informed groups have attacked the
appointment of Mp. Daniels with absurd and even calumnious
statements. The Government of Mexico is interested in cor
recting the "supposition" that the new American Ambassador
has been named by his government as a discourteous act em
bracing a stern and fearful warning* 2
In spite of this statement to the contrary, in Guadalajuara, Mexican po
lice raided dozens of houses and shops, seized and burned bales of liter-
23
ature demanding the expulsion of Ambassador Daniels by force.
The President of the United States continued to preach his gos
pel. On the eve of the London Disarmament Conference of May, 1933, Roose
velt oalled upon the nations of the world to agree to never send an armed
20Ibid., p. ISO.
21
Daniels was Secretary of the Navy when the navy bombarded Vera
Cruz in 1914*
og




foroe of whatever nature across their frontiers, and on December 29, 1933,
the President stated flatly that the policy of the United States is one
which is opposed to armed intervention. During the same month (December,
1933), Secretary of State Cordell Hull, head of the Amerioan delegation at
the Montevideo Conference, told the delegates of the twenty-one American
states that "everyone should know and thoroughly understand that the Roose
velt Administration is opposed to interference into the internal matters
24
of the governments of other nations,"
Roosevelt, as a follow-up to the expressions of good neighborli-
ness, ordered the last remaining units of the United States Marines to with-
25
draw from Nicaragua and Haiti. He refused to intervene actively in the
Cuban disorders of 1933, and terminated the Platt Amendment which gave to
the United States the right to intervene in the Cuban internal affairs,
27
By December, 1933, intervention had come to an end.
The stage had been set and the players were ready to take their
places in the great drama of Pan Americanism, Intervention, one of the
main points of contention between the Latin American oountries and the Uni
ted States, had been removed by Roosevelt. Another controversy dealing
with prohibitive trade barriers had been left to that able statesman, Cor
dell Hull, to use methods of his own choosing for attacking this very ser
ious question. The president had already made mention of the need for the
removal of restrictive trade barriers in his Pah Amerioan Day address of
24John M. Mathews, Amerioan Foreign Relations (New York, 1938),
p. 142-143.
25This process had been initiated by the Hoover Administration.
26Mathews, op. cit., p. 143.
27Van Alstyne, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
10
April 14, at Havana, Cuba*
... It is of vital interest to every Nation of this
Continent that the American Governments, individually,
take without further delay, such action as may be possible
to abolish all unnecessary and artificial barriers and re
strictions which now hamper the healthy flow of trade be
tween the peoples of the American Republics.28
Such was the condition in the American neighborhood in 1933 as
the nations prepared for the opening of the Seventh Inter-American Confer
ence held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in December, 1933,
28Rosenman, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
CHAPTER II
IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1933 TO THE END OF 1936
The first conference in -which the United States participated after
the pronouncement of the "Good Neighbor'1 policy was held at Montevideo, Uru
guay, in December, 1933. The United States delegation was headed by the
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. On arriving in the Uruguayan capital,
Hull sensed a very strong anti-United States atmosphere, and in his Memoirs
the following statement is founds
... One of my first sights from the ship was billboards
with huge words: "Down With Hull", and some of the newspapers
shown me spoke of the "big bully11 who had come down from the
north and wondered what he was up to now.
Another account of the reception given the United States delegation is fur
ther proof of the existing animositys
... Star delegates of the conference were silver-haired,
sweetly reasonable United States Secretary Gordell Hull and
Mexico's darkling pugnacious Foreign Minister Puig Casauranc.
Uruguayan communists let Senor Casauranc alone. • . but
strewed the path of the United States Secretary of State with
leaflets reading "Down With Bandit Hull} Down With Yankee Im
perialism: "2
On arriving at Montevideo, Secretary Hull called on all the
other delegations prior to the opening of the conference. He spent thir
ty or forty minutes with each preparing the way for better understanding
and cooperation. He assured each delegation thats
... There is nothing my government wants or is seeking
down here except to carry forward the doctrine of the "Good
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I,
p. 342.
2
"Foreign News", Time, Deoember 11, 1933, p. 19.
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Neighbor." We simply want to cooperate fully with all
Latin American countries in promoting the political and
economic ideals in which we are all like equally and mu
tually interested.3
Alexander Weddell, United States Ambassador to Argentina, in
formed Hull that Argentina had not decided until the last hour to send
a delegation and that the Foreign Ministry had planned to conduct a
fight from across the river against every important move of the United
States delegation.
The fact that Argentina decided at the last hour is proof that
that nation had not fully recovered from the rebuff given her at the Sixth
International Conference of American States of January, 1928, as shown by
her refusal to participate in the Special Washington Conference of December
of that same year. It is true, however, that the Montevideo Conference
would not have been very successful had the Argentine delegation held to
its original purpose mentioned by Weddell above.
The Argentine Government had proposed a general Anti-War Treaty
of Non-aggression and Conciliation during November, 1932, for the accep
tance of the nations of the world. This proposal was offered as a substi
tute for the Pan American peace treaties proposed and-accepted by most of
the American countries from 1923 to 1929. It is to be remembered that Ar
gentina had not ratified any of these treaties because that country be
lieved and regarded herself as the rightful leader of any Pan American
5
movement. The Argentine Government did not trust the United States.
3Hull, op. cit., I, p. 326.
4Ibid., p. 327.
5Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States,
p. 260.
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President Roosevelt had also proposed a non-aggression pact to
be signed by all nations in his statement of May 16, 1933, on the eve of
the London Conference, but Argentina succeeded in inducing five countries
of Latin America to sign the Lamas Anti-War Treaty of Non-aggression and
Conciliation just prior to the meeting of the Conference. On October 10,
7
1933, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Lamas Pact.
It appeared that the two great American republios - the United
States and Argentina - were vying for world supremacy even before the con
ference opened. Any inter-American conference was doomed to failure if
these two leading nations could not agree.
The Argentine delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Saavedra
Lamas, which had been appointed by the Government on November 30, reached
Montevideo December 2, 1933. Secretary Hull called on Foreign Minister
Lamas, and told him that the United States considered him an outstanding
Latin American statesman and advocate of peace, and that the purpose of
his visit was to seek his council.11. . . I know from your past record
that you will help us take the right direction and do so in a thoroughly
g
practical and efficient manner," said Hull.
It was during this meeting that Hull agreed to sign the Lamas
Anti-War Pact with the understanding that Lamas would use his influence
in getting the other nations, including Argentina, to sign the peace trea
ties. These treaties werei the Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Be-
6Roosevelt's Foreign Polioy 1933-1941 (New York, 1942), p. 12.
Bemis, op. eit., p. 270.
8Hull, op* cit., I, pp. 328-329.
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tween the American States, signed at the Fifth Pan American Conference
at Santiago, Chile, 1923; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris, 1928; the
Convention of Inter-American Conciliation aod the Convention of Inter-
American Arbitration, signed at Washington, January, 1929. Lamas agreed:
"We shall be the two wings of the dove of peace, you the economic and I
the political."9
This agreement coming on the eve of the conference added much
to the good spirit shown in the deliberations on the floor of the confer
ence.
The attitude of the American delegates of the Roosevelt Adminis
tration at the Seventh International Conference of American States was con
ciliatory, and for the first time the Latin Americans were given that which
10
they desired. They were permitted to air their grievances freely. The
friendly sincere and unassuming attitude of Secretary Hull, head of the
American delegation, created a very favorable impression upon the delegates
from the other states. The action of the American delegation is described
by Bends:
... They challenged nothing. They did not indulge in
debate. They spoke infrequently and briefly, though to the
point. They did not fill a single one of the nine committee
chairmanships. They made no attempt at leadership. That tljigy
left to the Argentine delegation, headed by Saavedra Lamas.
On the floor of the conference, Hull announced that the United
States was ready to accept the Lamas Anti-War Pact, and Lamas led in secur
ing the signatures to the older treaties*
The next problem to be worked out by the conference had to do
9Ibid., p. 322.
10
John H. Latane and David W. Wainhouse, A History of Aiaerioan
Foreign PolicjrjNew York, 1940), p. 675.
J. M. Mathews, American Foreign Relations, p. 146.
12Bemis, op. cit., p. 271.
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with the question of prohibitive trade barriers. It will be remembered
that in Havana, Cuba, 1923, the United States delegation, headed by Secre
tary of State Charles Evans Hughes, had repelled a proposal by Argentina
for a declaration against artificial trade barriers. The Argentine dele
gate, Honorio Pueyrredon, succeeded in raising the question in an indirect
way. He proposed to have included in the preamble to the Doctrine of Non
intervention a declaration against unreasonable trade barriers. At the
tixae, the Argentine delegation was particularly opposed to the sanitary
prohibition, which the United States had imposed against beef imports be-
13
cause of the foot and mouth disease found among Argentine cattle. Sec
retary Hughes in 1928 had said:
. , .To introduce the Pan American Union into these
most delicate of all subjects, relating to the exercise
by independent and sovereign states of their will with
respect to the articles coming in or leaving their boun
daries, would be simply to invite the destruction of the
Pan American Union.
Such was the United States policy of 1928 with reference to inter-American
tariff discussions.
The United States delegation of 1933, at Montevideo, however,
wanted to discuss the "most delicate" subject of trade barriers. This
time the other American nations were opposed to open discussion on the
subject. The cause for this "change of hearts" can be seen in the in
creased demands of the European markets for Latin American products,
Argentina and Great Britain, for instance, had signed a bilateral trade
13The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 was highly protective.
14Samuel G. Inman, Building an Inter-Amerioan Neighborhood
(Hew York, 1937), p. 41.
16
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agreement at the Roca Convention of May 1, 1933. Samuel G. Inman, mis
sionary-journalist, explained the situation in the following passages
... Every manufacturing country in the world had its rep
resentatives in South America endeavoring to make special ar
rangements with individual countries to sell more goods and to
get more of its frozen assets moving toward its own financial
center. °
Secretary Hull believed that American tariff agreements should
be made so as to place the United States in a position to actively oompete
with European countries with reference to Latin American trade. The plan
finally adopted at Montevideo called for the lowering of tariff by negoti
ation of bilateral or multilateral reciprocal treaties; the elimination
of duties that practically exclude international competition; continuation
of the unconditional most-favored nation clause; and the establishment of
a permanent international agency to distribute information concerning
17
progress made in reducing trade barriers.
The spirit of good will prevailed at the conference, in spite of
the objections of Argentina and other nations to some of the features of
the trade agreements, and the good neighbor idea exerted an important in
fluence in cementing the friendly relations between the United States and
the Latin Americans. The outstanding achievements of the conference as
summarized by President Roosevelt werej
. • .The creation of a new spirit of friendship and con
fidence among the repxiblics of the Americas; the beginning of
a strong bilateral trade policy; steps toward the establish
ment of peace machinery; steps in the improvement of inter-Am
erican communication and transportation; and collective adop
tion of the principle of non-intervention.
Bemis, op. eit., p. 337.
16
Inman, op. cit., p. 42,
17
Ibid.
*°S. I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, p. 522»
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To further substantiate the gains made at Montevideo toward mu
tual friendship, Hull took on the character of a "good will ambassador.11
He had traveled along the east coast of South America stopping at Brazil
on the journey to Montevideo, but he returned by way of the west coast so
as to visit as many neighbors as possible. The first stop on the return
trip was Buenos Aires where he spent two days talking to Argentine offi-
19
cials. President Roosevelt, in New York, made his famous Woodrow Wilson
Foundation address while Hull was in Argentina, and tiie clause "The defin
ite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed inter
vention" must have been very pleasing to Hull's ear. He next visited
Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama. Everywhere he made speeches,
selling the "Good Neighbor" idea by promoting friendship. During a dinner
given in his honor at Lima, Peru, Hull stated:
... We have just had a great demonstration at Montevideo,
a demonstration that common sense and sincerity can surmount all
obstacles when men of good will approach problems in a spirit of
mutual helpfulness. That conference was a convocation of good
neighbors. It was no place for demogogues and trouble makers,
for backbiters and detractors, for petty suspicion, for the har
angues of mere place hunting politicians.^
The United States backed up the pledges made by the delegation
at Montevideo with positive action. The Senate ratified all the pledges
signed by the delegates with reservations attached to two. One applied to
the Lamas Anti-War Treaty, the other applied to the pledge on the Rights
and Duties of States. The same reservation clause was applied to boths
"that in adhering to this treaty the United States does not thereby waive
21
any rights it may have under other treaties or under international law.
19Hull, op. cit.t I, pp. 339-341.
20
Ibid., p. 340.
^Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd. Sess., p. 11601.
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These same pledges did not have such easy going in the Argentine
capital. Although Foreign Minister Lamas signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact
and various Pan American peace treaties proposed at the Montevideo Confer-
22
ence, his government did not ratify any of them. It will be noted, how
ever, that the Argentine Republic gave its approval to only one treaty -
that mihich had been proposed by its own Foreign Minister Lamas. Although
it appeared that the relations between Hull and Lamas during the confer
ence were most cordial, the Argentine Government did not appear so friendly
in its refusal to ratify the treaties proposed by the United States and
ratified by the Senate. It appears that all the efforts of the United
States to convert Argentine t© the "Good Neighbor" idea did not meet with
the success desired by the Roosevelt administration. Argentina was still
the "not so good neighbor."
Another step taken by the Roosevelt administration to further
cement the cordial Latin American relations existing at the time with,
perhaps, the exception of Argentina was the organization of the Export-
Import Bank. This bank was incorporated in the District of Columbia by
Executive Order Number 6581, February 2, 1934, by authority granted by
the National Industrial Recovery Administration Act of June 16, 1933, the
Reconstruction Finanoe Corporation Act of January 22, 1932, and the Bank
Conservation Act of March 9, 1933.23 The purpose of the First Bank was to
assist in finanoing trade with Russia. However, a Second Bank was organ
ized in 1934 to finance trade with Cuba and other countries. The Second
24
Bank was merged with the First Bank in 1936. The balance sheet of the
22Bemis, op. cit., p. 261.
23Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, Documents on American




Export-Import Bank, as of December 31, 1941, shows that eighteen Latin Am
erican countries had been authorized loans* Argentina was authorized
25
), 120.00.
The United States Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Aet
during June, 1934, after much debate on the question of giving the presi
dent the power to regulate the tariff. It was held by some senators that
the power to regulate tariffs was a power granted by the Constitution to
the Congress alone and to give that power to the President would be trans
ferring congressional power to the executive branch of the government. The
State Department used its influence by supplying information to the various
committees of congress. The "farm block" was especially critical of the
bill. Although the act applied to all the countries of the world, the name
of Argentina came up more than once during the debate. The bill when fin
ally approved gave the president power to adjust tariff on articles within
a range of fifty per cent of the United States tariff level. Congress
maintained the right to have the final say on the act by having it termin
ate at the end of three years. It then must be renewed by act of congress*
... The new legislation was framed upon a combination
of three principles - tariff negotiation by Executive agree
ment; Congressional delegation to the President of the power
of tariff adjustment within prescribed limitsj and generali
zation of all tariff reductions (except those granted to Cuba)
to the products of all countries which do not discriminate
against American commerce.^
Most of the Latin American countries took advantage of the new Trade Agree
ments Aet during the early months. Argentina was among the last to complete
an agreement.
25
Bemis, op. cit., p. 352.
26
Cong. Rec., 73rd Cong., 2nd. Sess., p. 10395.
27
Francis B. Sayre, "How Trade Agreements Are Made", Foreign
Affairs, XVI, No. 3 (April, 1938), p. 417.
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From the time of the passage of the Trade Agreements Act by the
United States Congress in 1934 to October 14, 1941, when an agreement was
finally made, Argentina and the United States attempted several times to
make trade agreements, but each effort resulted in complete failure. It
was almost impossible for the two nations to make any mutually satisfac
tory agreement because of the fact that the agricultural products of the
two countries were and still are competitive. The cost of production in
the United States is much higher than that in Argentina. This means that
the ohief products of Argentina such as fruit, beef and hides could under
sell the American grown products on the American markets. The American
farmer, particularly the western cattle grower, has always objected to
free trade with Argentina. Another obstacle to free trade is the much
28
discussed foot and mouth disease prevalent among Argentine cattle.
The United States and Argentina signed a convention in 1935
which would have allowed the importation of inspected cattle from zones
that were free from the disease, but the United States Senate did not rati
fy the convention.29 An agreement was finally reached on October 14, 1941,
after years of discussion. The danger of becoming involved in the European
war, and the fact that any agreement is better than no agreement, the United
States was forced to make many concessions in the agreement.
The Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia was finally ended on
June 14, 1935, but not before a clash between the United States and Argen
tina had occurred in connection with the arbitration of that conflict. It
will be remembered that the Washington Conference of 1928 created a commis-
28Bemis, op. oit., pp. 304-305,
29Cong; Eec, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 14443-14445.
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sion of neutrals to conciliate the Chaco war, and that Argentina, because
of dissatisfaction at the Havana Conference, February, 1928, did not at
tend the Washington meeting. The effort of the Washington Commission to
conciliate the war was blocked by a rival commission, headed by Argentina.
The Washington Commission was composed of representatives of the United
States, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Uruguay, and the Argentine Commission
was composed of Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina. The Argentine Commis
sion denied that the countries had the right to "intervene into the af
fairs of another nation"} and submitted the question to the League of Na
tions. The Washington Commission, for the sake of harmony, yielded to
the League of Nations, which appointed a new commission of mediating coun
tries. The new neutral commission was composed of representatives of the
United States, Apgentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay with Lamas pre
siding. A temporary armistice was concluded in December, 1933, and in
30
June, 1935, the long war was brought to a close.
So the relations between the two big sisters of the American re
publics were not very cordial at the close of the year 1935. Most of the
inter-American aotivity of 1936 was centered around the conference held
during that year. The United States took the initiative in calling this
special meeting. President Roosevelt, on January 30, in personal letters
addressed to the presidents of all Latin American republics, suggested that
a special inter-Ameriean conference be summoned. The President's letter
read in parts
... I cherish the sincere conviction that the moment has
now arrived when the American republics, through their desig
nated representatives seated at a common council table, should
seize this altogether favorable opportunity to consider their
S0United States Department of State, Peace and War - United States
Foreign Policy 1951-1941, Government Printing Office, 1942, p. 26.
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joint responsibility and their common need of rendering
less likely in the future the outbreak or continuation
of hostilities between them, and by so doing, serve in
an eminently practical manner the cause of permanent
peace on this Western Continent.31
At the time of the letter suggesting the meeting of the American republics
to assemble, the new world was at peace* The long war between BoliTia and
Paraguay had been terminated, and the only conflict existing at the time
was a diplomatic one between the United States and Argentina, The Presi
dent probably had this in mind when he suggested Buenos Aires "should the
Government of the Argentine Republic so desire" as the place for the meet
ing. The Argentine Government had no objection to having the Conference
meet in its beautiful capital city. Invitations were sent out by Argentina
32
on August 20, 1936. It is the opinion of the writer that Argentina would
have been conspicuous among those absent had the meeting been called to meet
at any other place. The fact that the United States suggested the meeting
would have been one of the many reasons.
The official name of this conference was The Inter-American Con
ference for the Maintenance of Peace. The agenda as approved by the Govern
ing Board of the Pan-American Union, July 22, 1936, included the following
items: I. Organization of Peace; II. Neutrality; III. Limitation of Arma
ments j IV, Juridical Problems; V. Economic Problems; and VI. Intellectu-
33
al Cooperation.
The President, at Chautauqua, New York, August 14, 1936, re
stated his purpose - that of the Good Neighbor. He admitted that the United
^United States Department of State, Report of the Delegation of
United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Mainten~






States was strong but that the less powerful nations had no need of fear
of the United States. He stated among other thingss
... The American Republics to the South of us hare
been ready always to cooperate with the United States on
a basis of equality and mutual respect, but before we
inaugurated the good neighbor policy there was among
them resentment and fear, because certain administrations
in Washington had slighted their national pride and their
sovereign rights. ... Throughout the Americas the spirit
of the good neighbor is a practical and living fact. The
twenty-one American republics are not only living togeth
er in friendship and peacej they are united in the deter
mination so to remain,34
The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was
35
scheduled to open on December 1, 1936. The Government of Argentina in
vited President Roosevelt to visit and take part in the opening of the
Conference, and he gladly accepted the invitation to help initiate what
he believed to have been the greatest opportunity in the interest of the
HGood neighbor11 policy. On December 1, 1936, Franklin Roosevelt addressed
the opening session of the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. In
his address he suggested a strong united band of American:States to repel
any aggressor nation. He said:
... We in the Americas make it at the same time clear
that we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determina
tion that others, who, driven by war madness or land hunger,
might seek to commit acts of aggression against us, will find
a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mu
tual safety and our mutual good. ... It is our duty by ev
ery honorable means to prevent any future war among ourselves
.... For my own part I have done all in my power to sustain
34Ruhl J. Bartiett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York,
1947), pp. 551-552.
The American delegation appointed by President Roosevelt on
October 31, 1936 follows j Chairman of the Delegations Cordell Hull, Secre
tary of State; Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State} Alexander W.
Weddell, United States Ambassador to Argentina} Adolf A. Bbrle, Jr., Cham
berlain of New York City; Alexander F. Whitney, President of the Brother
hood of Railroad Trainmen; Charles G. Fenwick, Professor of Political Sci
ence, Bryn Mawr College; Michael Francis Doyle, Lawyer, Philadelphia; and
Mrs. Elise F. Musser, State Senator, Utah. Report of Delegates, p. 7.
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the consistent efforts of my Secretary of State in ne
gotiating agreements by reciprocal trade. ...
The magnetic President received a clamorous ovation from the as
sembled delegates* A contest was in the making between the United States
and Argentina even as the President was making his address. The Argentine
delegation was again headed by Foreign Minister Lamas who had drafted a
project for voluntary collaboration with the measures and sanctions of the
League of Nations by non-member nations which had accepted the Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact or the Lamas Anti-War Pact. Hull, on the other hand, had a plan
for Pan Americanizing recent neutrality laws of the United States and for
setting up a permanent consultive oommittee with reference to inter-Amer-
37
ican wars*
On December 5, Hull addressed the Conference and outlined the
United States program for the maintenance of peace in what he called the
"Eight Pillars of Peace." They are summarized as follows:
1. Peoples must be educated for peace* Each nation must make
itself safe for peace.
2. Frequent conferences between representatives of nations,
and intercourse between their peoples, are essential.
3* The consummation of the five well known peace agreements
will provide adequate peace machinery.
4. In the event of war in this hemisphere, there should be
a common policy of neutrality*
5. The nations should adopt commercial policies to bring each
that prosperity upon which enduring peace is founded*
6* Praotioal international cooperation is essential to re
store many indispensable relationships between nations and prevent
the demoralization with which national character and conduct are
threatened*
7. International law should be reestablished, revitalized,
and strengthened. Armies and navies are no permanent substitute
for its great principles.
36Roosevelt«s Foreign Policy, pp* 111-114.
Bemis, op* cit#, p» 284,
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8. Faithful observance of undertakings between nations
is the foundation of international order, and rests upon
moral law, the highest of all law.38
On December 7, 1936, Hull presented the United States plan for
international peace. This plan did not include any reference to the
League of Nations. It was truly an inter-American plan. It called for a
permanent Consultative Committee, composed of the Foreign Ministers of
the American countries. This committee would be empowered to investigate
all incidents and differences and decide if a state of war existed. The
parties to the treaty agreed to enforce against the belligerents embargoes
39
of credit, arms, and other implements of war.
Opposed to the Hull plan was the Argentine plan. This plan
called for voluntary collaboration with the League of Nations, and for
consultation by negotiation among the contracting parties in case of vio
lation by any of them of the existing inter-American peace treaties. La
mas was opposed to any permanent committee as presented by Hull. The Ar
gentine minister also included a plan for absolute non-intervention which
would outlaw excessive diplomatic intervention. The Lamas plan called
for a world wide plan organization.40 After much discussion, a watered
down plan was approved by the Conference which was a compromise hetween
the inter-American-Hull plan and the Lamas universal plan. Hull's comment
on the compromise follows:
38Report of Delegates, op. cit., p. 11.
39Bemis, op. cit., pp. 285-286.
40Ibid.
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. . • Finally, in order to obtain complete agreement,
the resolution was watered down. Consultation among the
republics was agreed to in case of any threat to peace in
the Western Hemisphere, but the idea of a permanent inter-
American Consultative Committee was dropped.^l
The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was
a success. An international conference cannot be judged on the output
alone. The United States tried at Buenos Aires to get a stronger group
ing of the American states, but met with Argentine resistence and a some
what warm response from Brazil. However, in spite of Argentina, the Con
ference adopted two treaties, eight conventions an additional protocol rel
ative to non-intervention, and sixty-two resolutions, recommendations and
declarations* The following instruments were signed by the delegates:
Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestab-
lishment of Peacej
Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention}
Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Ful
fillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American
States}
Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies}
Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation}
Convention on the Pan American Highway}
Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural
Relations}
Convention on the Interchange of Publications}
Convention Concerning Artistic Exhibitions}
Convention Concerning Peaceful Orientation of Public
Instruction}
Convention Concerning Facilities for Educational and
Publicity Films.42
The last two conventions were not signed by the United States Delegation.
This was due to the fact that the National Government cannot commit itself
on educational matters as this is handled by the several states.
41Hull, op. cit.# I, p. 498.
42
Report of Delegates, op. oit., p. 15.
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Again, as at the Montevideo Conference of 1933, the United
States delegation apparently left the actual administration of the Con-
43
ference to the Argentine delegation.
The United States Senate ratified the agreements reached and
signed by its delegates at the Inter-American Conference for the Mainten
ance of Peace, without a record vote on June 29, 1937, and with only min
or changes in the original text as submitted by President Roosevelt on
May 26. However, the same oannot be said of Argentina. Bemis, in de
scribing the Argentine non-action says 5
... The Argentine Government did not ratify any of the
inter-American peace treaties in any way, shape or manner,
even those which it signed in its own capital, not even the
Additional Protocol Relative to Non-intervention. Where it
could not lead, it would not join.45
This adverse attitude of Argentina had to be reckoned with
during the crucial period beginning with 1937 and continually throughout
the pre-war years to 1941. The events in Europe seem to have intensified
Argentine obstruction as shall be pointed out in the next chapter.
43The list of general officers shows the Argentine delegation
holding the mo3t important offices. Officers of the Conference were:
Temporary President of the Conference: Carlos Saavedra Lamas; President
of the Conference: Carlos Saavedra Lamasj Secretary-General of the Con
ferences Filipe A. Espil, Ambassador of Argentina to the United States
of America; Assistant Secretary-General of the Conferences Divico A.
Furnkorn of Argentina; Pan American Union: Leo S. Rowe, Director Gener
al and William Manger, Counselor. Report of Delegates, p» 55.
44Cong. Rec, 75th Cong., 1st. Sess., pp. 6493-6508.
Bemis, op. cit., p. 291.
CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN NATIONS AND CONTINENTAL SOLIDARITY
Events in Europe occupied the attention of the American nations
during 1937 and 1938. Adolph Hitler, who had risen to power in Germany in
1933, had reached a new low in his persecution of the Jews. His actions
had been criticized severely by American statesmen, including President
Roosevelt, members of the cabinet, Mayor LaGuardia, of New York City, and
others. The German press replied to these attacks in vehement terms.
In September, 1938, Hitler demanded the Sudetenland, which at
the time was a part of Czechoslovakia. At Munich, September 30, France
2
and England yielded and Germany was given Sudetenland.
With affairs in such a state because of the actions of Germany
and Italy, the United States welcomed the coming of the Eighth Interna
tional Conference of Amerioan States scheduled to meet December 9, 1938.
The United States Government had a two-fold purpose: "... Keep the Amer
icas out of war and keep war out of the Americas." Ihen the Conference
opened at Lima, Peru, December 9, 1938, the danger of Axis penetration of
Latin America by military invasion or by the indirect method of propagan-
4
da organizing political parties was real and imminent.
■^T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American_People_, p. 748.
2IbicU
J. Fred Rippy, "The Buenos Aires Peace Conference of 1936", The
South Atlantic Monthly, XXXVI (January, 1937), p. 171.
%U11, Memoirs of jlordglljjall, J» PP« 601-602.
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The danger evidently had not been realized by Argentina.
As early as March, 1938, Jose Maria Cantilo, Argentine Foreign Minister
who had replaced Saavedra Lamas, suggested that the Lima Conference be
postponed for two years. He had also said to S. Pinckney Tuck, United
States Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, that although Argentina believed
in some type of continental solidarity, she could not turn her back on
Europe, and would not sign any military pact that might give that impres-
sion to the world.
The opening address of the Conference was delivered by Cantilo,
who was head of the Argentine delegation. He placed emphasis on the fact
that there were vast differences between the cultures, religions, eoonom-
7
ics and foreign policies of""the United States and those of Latin America,
The minister was all for oooperation, but was against any strong declara
tion or statement to that effect. He saids
. • . Pan American solidarity is a fact that nobody can or
will doubt. All and each one of us is ready to sustain and
prove this solidarity, in the face of any danger, which, from
whatever source, might threaten the independence or sovereign
ty of any state of this part of the world. We do not require
special pacts for this. The pact is already made in our his
tory. We would act with one and the same impulse, eliminating
frontiers and under one flag for everybody, the flag of liber
ty and justice.8
Hull presented the United States objectives on December 10. The Secretary
wanted to strengthen the Consultative Pact which had been signed at the
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7S. F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States,
p. 352.
8
Hull» op. oit., I, p. 605.
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Buenos Aires Conference of 1936. He wanted a strong statement that would
be effective toward slowing down any European plans for ideological or
military invasion of the Western Hemisphere. In his statement he declared
that:
. . . Each and all of us desire to maintain friendly
relations with every nation of the world. ... But there
should not be a shadow of a doubt anywhere as to the deter
mination of the American nations not to permit the invasion
of this hemisphere by activities contrary or inimical to
their basis of relations among nations.8
The Conference finally adopted a compromise of all the different views and
aims of the different nations. There can be no solidarity unless there is
unanimity. Each nation had its own interest to consider. Argentina had
little trouble in leading Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia to balk at
any strong declaration aimed at Europe. 10 Part of the Declaration of Lima
as adopted by the Conference is as follows:
The American Republics declares
1. That they reaffirm their continental solidarity and
their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the prin
ciples upon which the said solidarity is based;
2. That, faithful to the above-mentioned principles and
to their absolute sovereignty, they reaffirm their decision
to maintain them and to defend them against all foreign inter
vention or activity that may threaten them;
3. And in case the peace, security, or territorial integ
rity of any American Republic is thus threatened by acts of any
nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern
and their determination to make effective their solidarity,
coordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the
procedure of consultation, established by convention in force
and by declaration of the Inter-American conferences, using the
measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisa
ble. It is understood that the Governments of the American Re
publics will act independently in their own individual capacity, 1]L
recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign states. . .
9||Text of Secretary Hull's Speech at Lima", Mew York Times, Dec.
11, 1938, p. 56 L.
10
John H. Latane and David W. Wainhouse, A History of American
Foreign Policy, pp. 873-874.
UIbid.
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The Declaration also inoluded provisions for meetings of the foreign min
isters when deemed advisable by any one of them.
The Conference also adopted the "Declaration of American Princi
ples." This declaration contained eight rules of conduct, which the Amer
ican nations pledged to observe in their inter-American affairs. In order
to combat the "Fifth Column11, the conference adopted a resolution on
foreign minorities and on the political activities of foreigners. The Con-
12
feronce adjourned on December 27, 1938.
During 1939, the United States made another attempt to close the
big, open link in the Roosevelt chain of "Good Neighbors" in the Western
Hemisphere. This link was Argentina. Since 1934, the United States had
tried to overcome: Argentina's historic dominance by Great Britain} her
fear of United States imperialism; her insistence that the United States
lift its 1930 ban on imports of Argentine beef; and Argentina's across the
13
table system of bilateral trade. The job was assigned to Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State, and Argentine Ambassador Felipe Espil. Roose
velt, Hull and Welles wanted a United States-Argentine reciprocal trade
agreement, and tried to find ways and means to convince the Ambassador
that with the United States and not Great Britain lay Argentina's future.
This was not an easy task due to the strong economic ties between the two
countries. Great Britain had approximately #2,000,000,000 invested in Ar
gentina. She owned the largest Argentine railroad, and had customarily
taken about 40 per cent of all Argentine exports. However, Argentina
12Ibid., p. 872.
^"Goodwill in the Pampas", Time, September 4, 1939, pp. 10-11.
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noted that Great Britain was steadily shifting its agricultural trade to
its colonies, and that Argentina was being set up only as a great emergen
cy storehouse for wartime food supply. During the last week in August,
1939, Argentina suddenly changed its trade system to one of import control,
freezing foreign exports to Argentina at 1934-1936 levels, then setting
import quotas. With this shift by Argentina to multilateral trade, Welles
. 14
stepped in and the United States announced a proposed trade agreement.
It was believed at the time that, perhaps, a satisfactory agreement could
be reaohed and that a trade agreement would soon be perfected between the
two nations. The following statement appearing in Time was proof of the
belief!
... Argentina, world's greatest cattle exporter, had
given way at last on its beef. The United States still will
not import fresh, chilled or frozen meat from the pampas, in
deference to the ire of United States cattle men. . • • The
United States' concession to the Argentine will come on
canned, cured and dogfood meats, linseed, flaxseed, grapes,
pears and coarse wools• **>
All the optimism of September, 1939, was chilled by the statement issued
jointly by the United States and Argentina January 9, 1940, which follows:
... In the reciprocal trade negotiations between the
Governments of the United States and Argentina, notwithstand
ing the efforts of both parties, it has not been found possi
ble to reach a satisfactory basis to permit the conclusion of
an agreement, and the two governments have agreed to termin
ate them. • • . "
In keeping with the pledge made in the Declaration of Lima, De
cember, 1938, nine governments requested a meeting of the foreign ministers
14Ibid.
15Ibid., p. 11.
16S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. layers, Documents on American
Foreign Relations July 1939 - June 1940 (Boston, 1940), II, p. 479.
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to be convened in Panama during September, 1939. The purpose of the meeting
will be noted in the statement of the Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs:
♦ . . In view of the recent international events which have
stirred the entire world, the Government of Panama has joined
with the greatest of pleasure the joint request which the Govern
ments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the United
States of America, Mexico and Peru have sent to the sister re
publics of the American Continent for the purpose of placing
into operation the procedure of consultation provided for and
agreed upon in the pertinent conventions and declarations of
Buenos Aires and Lima, and to hold, with that purpose in mind,
a conference among the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the
twenty-one American republics in Panama City,17
The Panama meeting of the Foreign Ministers opened on September
23, 1939. One of the first matters to be taken up by the foreign ministers
in their first meeting was that of neutrality. The United States had taken
the necessary action to safeguard its neutrality. Congress had adopted the
first Neutrality Act in August, 1935, which included temporary measures to
safeguard the neutrality of the United States in face of the conflict between
Italy and Ethiopia. The 1936 Neutrality Acts were passed in view of the
war clouds gathering in Europe. The acts strengthened and extended the
Act of 1935, and in January, 1937, the Third Neutrality Act made the form-
18
er acts applicable to civil as well as to international war. It appears
that the purpose of the United States at the time of the first meeting of
the foreign ministers was that of Pan Americanizing the already passed
American neutrality acts.
The ministers on October 3, 1939, approved a General Declaration
of Neutrality and the Declaration of Panama. There were other matters dis
cussed but these were perhaps the most important declarations. The Neutral-
7Ibid., pp. 99-100.
1 ft
Rippy, «The Buenos Aires Peace Conference of 193611, loc. cit.,
p. 171.
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ity Declaration provided for common rules of neutrality such as prevention
of the use of their territories by warring nations as bases for operation,
enlistment, or the establishment of radio stations for propaganda broad
casts.19 The Declaration of Panama stated that, for continental self-pro
tection, the American republics, so long as they were neutral, were enti
tled to have the water next to them free from any ships of the warring na
tions. The purpose of this clause was to keep the warships of Germany,
France and England out of American waters. The declaration outlined a
zone of 300 to 1000 miles out from the coast of North and South America*
This neutral zone was to be patrolled by the American republics. The Pres
ident of Panama was authorized to notify the warring nations of the zone
20
and to request them to respect it. The declaration also placed the Amer
icas on record as being opposed to any change of sovereignty of colonies
21
in the American region.
Among the other accomplishments of the Panama meeting was the
creation of two permanent standing inter-American committees. One commit
tee, the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, was com
posed of representatives of each of the American republics. Its purpose
was to make a study of all financial and economic questions affecting the
American nations. This committee was very useful during the war in keeping
inter-American communications and trade open. The second committee, the
Inter-American Juridical Committee, was intended to formulate general stand
ards of conduct relative to the neutral status of the American states. The
19
Hull» op» cit.t i., p. 689.
2.0
Jones and Ityers, op. cit., pp. 115-117.
21
w H. Chamberlain and R. C. Snyder, American Foreign Policy,
p. 706.
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work of this committee was enlarged in scope by the Third Consultative Meet-
go
ing of January, 1942. The ministers completed their work on October 3,
1939.
There were many violations of the American Neutral Zone declar
ation. One British merchantman was sunk within the zone even as the Pana
ma Conference was in session. There were many diplomatic notes exchanged
with the belligerents over the American zone. The most outstanding viola
tion of the declaration occurred in December, 1939. Three British cruisers
attacked the German battleship Graf Von Spee just off the coast of Uruguay,
The damaged German ship went into the harbor at Montevideo. The Uruguayan
Government ordered the ship to depart or be interned. The German command
er, seeing that his ship could not have been repaired within the time limit,
steamed outside the harbor and scuttled his ship. Protests were sent to
England, France and Germany.*" Replies were forwarded by each of the na
tions concerned. The replies of the European nations were varied. Churoh-
ill replied that Great Britain would be glad to respect the wishes of the
American states, if America required all belligerent to comply. He further
stated:
... The acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the
suggestion. * • must clearly be dependent upon their being as
sured that the adoption of the zone proposal would not provide
a sanctuary from which they (the Germans) could emerge to at
tack Allied and neutral shipping, to which they could return
to avoid being brought to action. • • .**
Churchill also stated that Britain would readily comply if the United States
Navy took charge of the patrolling*
22Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 1944), pp. 212-
213.
23
Hull, op. oit., pp. 690-691.
9A.
Jones and Myers, op. oit., pp. 122-125.
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The French believed that the American neutral zone would work to
the disadvantage of the Allies. The French reply of January 23, 1940, stat
ed thats
• • • Numerous German merchant vessels normally have no
other resource for the escaping the legitimate exeroise of
the right of taking prizes than to seek refuge in American
ports. The institution of the zone of protection could have
the effect of releasing them and thus depriving the Allies of
advantages for them arising out of their naval superiority
over Germany. It would therefore have to include, on the
part of each American government, effective measures adopted
to hol{L.in its ports the German ships which have taken refuge
there*
The German Government declared that the Declaration of Panama
would mean a change in existing international law, and that the German
Government was willing to take up consideration of the proposals. In other
words, the German Government declared the declaration ill^al under exist
ing international law. The German reply stated in effect thats
... The German Government cannot recognize the right of
the Governments of the American Republics to decide unilater
ally upon measures in a manner deviating from the rules hith
erto in effect, • • «26
It is to be noted that Argentina was in complete accord with the
proceedings of the First Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers. There
is no mention of Argentine obstructions as has been the case in former
meetings. The Argentine attitude at this meeting was noted by Sumner
Welles. His statement follows:
• • • I must emphasize the altogether co-operative, helpful-
and able services rendered during the meeting at Panama by the
Argentine delegation, headed by Dr. Leopold© Melo» Dr. Melo's





him to be generally regarded as one of the elder states
men of the Western Hemisphere, and at the meeting he con
sistently exercised his ability to achieve practical and
successful results. In fact, throughout the meeting
there was not the slightest cloud upon the horizon of in
ter-American unity.
After the failure of the United States and Argentina to reach an
agreement as expressed in the joint statement of January 8, 1940, the Argen
tine nation felt free to seek elsewhere for trade agreements. In the face
of United States denunciation of Japanese aggression in China and the term
ination of the United States-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 by the Uni
ted States , July 26, 1939, to be effective January, 1940, 28 Argentina and
Japan signed a reciprocal trade agreement under the terms of which both
countries agreed to buy goods from each other to the value of thirty million
yen (#15,000,000)* during the current year of 1940.
With the downfall of France and the apparent suocess of the German
army, it became evident that there was a strong possibility that Germany
might take over the French possessions in the New World. The Congress of the
United States, at the proposal of Hull, passed a joint resolution, June 18,
1940, which statedj
... That the United States would not recognize,any trans
fer, and would not acquiese in any attempt to transfer, any geo
graphic region of this hemisphere from one non-American power to
another non-American powers and that if such transfer or attempt
to transfer should appear likely, the United States shall, in ad
dition to other measures, immediately consult with the other Am
erican republics to determine upon steps which should be taken to
safeguard their common interest.^
27Welles, op. cit., p. 214,
28
Jones and Myers, op. cit., p. 242.
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Whitney Shepardson and William 0. Soroggs, The United States in
World Affairs (New York, 1941), p. 369.
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Secretary Hull warned Germany and Italy on June 18, 1940, that the United
States would not tolerate any transfer of colonies in the Western Hemis-
31
phere from one non-American power to another. The Ggrman foreign minis
ter replied to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine would prevent any inter-
vention by the United States into the affairs of Europe.
Other activity on the part of the United States to supplement the
Good Neighbor policy during 1940 was the extention of the Trade Agreements
33
Acts, and the granting of a huge loan to Argentina. The Export-Import
Bank extended credit of $60,000,000 to Argentina* This loan was designed
to stabilize the currency of that country, and thereby permit imports to
continue in spite of the loss of normal exports of that country due to the
war.
The American foreign ministers convened July 21, 1940, at Havana,
Cuba. The agenda prepared by a special committee of the Governing Board of
the Pan American Union contained the followingt Neutrality, Protection of
the Peace of the Western Hemisphere, and Economic Cooperation. Hull, in
addressing the meeting, called for inter-American action based on self de
fense to preserve the freedom of every American state. He stated that the
European possessions in America should not be permitted "to become a sub
ject of barter in European settlement or a battle ground for adjustment of
such differences existing in Europe1* # He proposed the establishment of
31
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a trusteeship in the name of all American republics over the European poss
essions, whioh were to be restored to the owners or be declared independent,
when they become able to govern themselves.
The question debated was whether a definite line of procedure, to
be followed immediate when the ocoasion arose, should be arranged in advance
or should the states await developments of European events before consulta
tion as to the next step. Hull insisted on immediate action so as to keep
the colonies out of German hands in case of a German victory. Argentine^
delegate maintained that immediate aotion was not neoessary, that the people
of the territories should be consulted before being brought under a new ad
ministration. He based his argument on the fact that the assumption of au
thority over territory claimed by a European government would be considered
an aet of war, and that he could not commit his country to war because that
could only be done by the Argentine Congress*
The outstanding accomplishment of the Conference was the "Act of
Havana Concerning the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and
Possessions in the Americas," and "the Convention on the Provisional Admia-
37
istration of European Colonies in the Americas." The representatives ap
proved plans for a joint trusteeship of disputed European territory in the
Hew World, for economic collaboration, and for means to combat "fifth column"




37Wells, op. cit., p. 215.
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The large percentage of Germans included in the total Argentine
population could be advanced as one reason for the increased Nazi activi
ty during 1940. Argentina appears to have had more trouble than any other
American republic in the matter of Nazi "fifth column" activity. Of the
estimated total population of 12,760,000, there were approximately 250,000
Germans. These figures include descendants to the third generation. Ger
many held to the "double nationality" theory of citizenship, which meant a
German may move to live anywhere in the world, but once a German always a
G|rman. In connection with an investigation of Nazi and "fifth column"
activities, twenty-five Nazi leaders and several Argentine citizens were
arrested and large stocks of machine guns, rifles and ammunition were dis
covered.
. • .The Government of Argentina unearthed a secret cache of
hidden arms hidden by the bund on the premises of a German. This
contained 50 machine guns, 3,500 rifles, and several hundred thous
and rounds of ammunition.40
A deported gestapo agent and his followers were arrested in Argentina for
attacking Jews and business establishments owned by Jews.
Such was the condition in Aj.gentina with the coming of the criti
cal war years of 1941-1945.
39Howell M. Henry, "Nazi Threat to Western Hemisphere", The South




ARGENTINE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS DURING THE WAR YEARS
Although the efforts of the United States and Argentina to reach
a satisfactory trade agreement ended in failure January 8, 1940, Argentina
indicated to the United States delegates attending the Havana Conference of
July, 1940, that the war and blockade had upset her international commerce.
Argentina asked if the United States would purchase quantities pf the Argen
tine surpluses that had accumulated. This gave rise to the negotiations be-
1
ginning on May 13, 1941. This new effort resulted in the trade agreement
of October 14, 1941.
The Argentine-United States agreement reduced United States tariff
on 69 per cent of its imports from Argentina and guaranteed not to increase
or levy duties on most of the others. Argentina reduced its tariff on only
18. 2 per cent of imports from the United States, and agreed not to discrim
inate against the United States except in favor of Great Britain and the
2
states of the "sterling area" and Argentina's near neighbors. The agreement
seemed to have been all in the favor of Argentina. The United States, howev
er, kept its "favorite nation" concession with reference to Cuba.
To properly determine the general attitude of the Argentine cit
izens toward the United States during the war years would require an inten
sive study of the different elements of that complex population. However,
^Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, p. 1140.




a study of the newspaper accounts, statements, and editorials shows
United States sentiment in Buenos Aires, during 1941, as being divided.
An editorial in La Prensa of Buenos Aires statedj
. . . The need becomes more evident every day to cooper
ate for the defense of the continent, threatened by the Eur
opean war to become a victim of the aggression of peoples
who have shown their contempt for the existence of indepen
dent nations.^
The opposite sentiment was expressed in Moticias Graficas of the same
citys
. . . What if the United States, the great democracy to
the north, does enter the war? The United States has polit
ical, economic, financial, sad even racial motives, which
though most respectable, Argentina, to state it frankly, has
not.
It is now an established fact that the officials in control of
the Argentine Republic engaged in grave complicity with Nazi Germany
during the war years. These officers of the Argentine Government pre
ferred an Axis victory over the Allies. This fact was disclosed to Ger
many only.5 The United States State Department, through investigations
conducted in Germany since the war, has uncovered facts to prove that:
... In lay, 1942, aeting President Castillo frankly con
veyed to Germany through authorized channels that he believed in
and hoped for "the victory of the Axis Powers"; that he had
"based his policy upon that" desired result} and that, rather
than sever relations with the Axis, he had determined, if neces
sary, "eventually to come out openly on the side of the Axis pow
ers." Those who seized the reign of power in 1943 shared this
attachment even more deeply and implemented it in many ways.
3"I See By the Papers", The Pan American Magazine, June, 1941,
p. 38.
5United States Department of State, The Argentine Situation^
Government Printing Office (Washington, 1946), p. 5. Hereafter re
ferred to as The Argentine Situation.
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In spite of the obstruction of the Argentine Government, the
"Good Neighbor" policy served a very useful purpose during the critical
years of World War II. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, the republics of America attempted to live up to their pledge
stated in the Act of Havana of 1940. The countries which had been the
victims of United States intervention prior to 1933 were first to come
to the aid of their sister republic. Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Repub
lic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica de
clared war against the enemies of the United States and took their stand
with the United Nations in the Declaration of January 1, 1942. All the
other countries sent messages of sympathy. Even Argentina declared that
7
she would not treat the United States as a belligerent*
The death of President Ortiz placed the government of Argentina
in the hands of Vice President Ramon Castillo. The views of the new pres
ident were quite different from those of his predecessor. He permitted
his foreign minister to determine the foreign policy of the nation. The
actions of Foreign Minister Guinazi were determined for him by the ultra
nationalist groups, by elements in the army that were openly pro-Nazi, and
8
by other reactionary influences in Argentina,
On December 9, 1941, two days after Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull
sent notes to the other American republics requesting a meeting of the
foreign ministers as provided for in the Declaration of Havana of 1940.
The meeting was arranged and scheduled to meet January 15, 1942, at Rio
L. M. Goodrich, S. S. Jones and D. P. %ers, Documents on Amer
ican Foreign Relations (Boston, 1942), IV, pp. 336-341.
a
Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, p» 225.
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de Janerio, Brazil. There were some objections to the meeting from the
Argentine Republic. That nation had objected to the signing of the Uni
ted Nations Charter by nine Latin American countries without consulting
the other American nations. She objected to calling the meeting of the
foreign ministers on the grounds that Japan had attacked Hawaii and not
the American continent itself, and that no aggression had been committed
upon the New World, therefore, there was no legitimate reason for immedi
ate consultation. The Argentine Government did not get any support from
the other Latin American republics and later announced that it would be
represented at the meeting of the ministers*
Prior to the departure of the delegation, the United States
sent to Argentina and Brazil the text of a proposed declaration breaking
10
off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. This procedure proved
to be a diplomatic blunder in that it gave the Argentine Government time
to build up opposition even before tiie meeting convened. The Argentine
minister, Guinazi, arranged a meeting, before the conference, with the
foreign ministers of Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile. He hoped to
create a bloc, which would oppose the objectives of the United States,
After the meeting, the Argentine minister found that he had only one
11
sympathizer - Chile.
When the foreign ministers of American States met in Rio de
Janerio, January, 1942, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela introduced a draft
which proposed a clean-cut break by all with all three enemies, but due
9Ibid., p. 220.
Hull, op. cit., II, p. 1144,
Goodrich, Jones and Myers, op. cit., IV, PP. 339-340.
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to the opposition of Argentina and Chile, this original draft had to be
12
changed to secure unanimity. This is what the United States desired
most of all. The final declaration as signed by the ministers contained
the following important paragraph:
... The American Republics, in accordance with the
procedures established by their own laws and in conformi
ty with the position and circumstances obtaining in each
country in the existing continental conflict, recommend
the breaking of their diplomatic relations with Japan,
Germany and Italy, since the first-mentioned State at
tacked and the other two declared war on an American coun
try.13
There was a strong demand by the republics who had agreed to the
first draft to leave Argentina and Chile to pursue a separate course of
14
action, but the United States insisted on unanimity.
Welles, in explaining the action of Argentina during 1942, pave
as the principal reason for Argentine obstruction the fact that fate had
been unkind to that nation. President Ortiz, whose influence would hare
succeeded in keeping Argentina united with other American republics, had
passed from the scene. Three leaders, all opposed to Argentine neutrali
ty, died almost at the same time. These were former Presidents Alvear and
Justo, and Vice President Rooa. The Castillo Government imposed strict
censorship over all sources of information. This method was also used by
the government that succeeded the Castillo government in 1943. This cen
sorship deprived the Argentine citizen of accurate knowledge of world af
fairs. It was impossible for the public to know the reaction of other
12Welles, op. cit., p. 233.
Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York,
1947^, pp. 558-559.
s, op. cit., p. 233.
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Latin American nations to the Argentine foreign policy.
It is believed that Argentine-Nazi complicity was suspected by
American delegates at the Rio Conference. This belief can be substantia
ted by the fact that the United States insisted on unanimity at the expense
of changing the original draft so as to have Argentina sign the declaration.
Recent investigations by the United States State Department have
revealed that Argentina requested submarines, airplanes, tanks, anti-tank
guns, anti-aircraft guns, powder and other materials of war from Germany
16
during the months of July, August, September and October, 1942. The Ar
gentine Government and one of Hitler's secret agents selected an Argentine
Nazi by the name of Osmar Helmuth to enter into negotiations with the Ger
man Government in Berlin for arms. This venture failed only because the Al-
17
lies arrested Helmuth while enroute to Berlin. In July, 1942, the Nazis
promised Argentine deliveries of German supplies by German blookade runners,
but when the handling of the matter did not satisfy Hitler, Ribbentrop
forced severance of relations by Argentina. German officials questioned by
the occupation forces have stated that steps were taken in 1943 by represen
tatives of the Argentine military in collaboration with Nazi agents for the
18
penetration of Paraguay and Uruguay.
The German Embassy in Argentina was provided a clear channel for
the transfer of funds between Germany and Argentina by the use of "confi-
19
dence" men in Argentina and in neutral Europe. German business firms,
15Ibid., p. 235.
16






well known by the United States Foreign Office, enjoyed freedom in Ar
gentina. The reason for this freedom is now known. After attending the
Rio Conference and the Washington Conference in 1942, the Argentine
Foreign Minister, Ruiz Guinazi, gave the Ggrman Charge d1 Affaires assur
ance that the measures adopted by Argentina in 1942 for the inspection of
20
German enterprises would not operate so as to disturb German interest*
On January 20, 1943, Chile formally broke off diplomatic rela
tions with Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus, all the American nations uni
ted against the common enemies with the exception of Argentina. That
country continued to act in negligent fashion toward the activities of
the Axis representatives. On June 4, 1943, the Castillo Government was
overthrown by a military revolutionary committee, which resulted in Gen-
21
eral Pedro Ramirez becoming President of the Argentine Republic. The
United States, thinking that the change was for the better, recognized
the new government on June 11. The new officers of Argentina promised to
break off relations with the Axis as soon as possible. However, Argentina
oontinued to maintain friendly relations with Germany, Italy and Japan.
Argentine Foreign Minister Storni informed the United States that the Ra
mirez Government could not break with the Axis Powers without serious re-
22
percussions.
The United States began to put economic pressure on Argentina
August 2, 1943, when the Office of Economic Warfare announced that all li-
23
censes for export of commodities to Argentina had been revoked. On Oeto-
20Ibid., pp. 45-46.
21
Hull» OP* Pi*** II* P» 1385«
22
Ibid., p. 1386.
2SLeland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, Documents on American
Foreign Policy (Boston, 1945), VI, p. 524.
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ber 7, 1943, Argentina recalled Felipe Espil, Argentine Ambassador at
24
Washington, and appointed Adrain Escobar to his position. On October
12, 1943, all Jewish newspapers in Buenos Aires were ordered to cease
publication, and on this same date all Argentine cabinet members who had
25
favored the immediate breaking of relations with the Axis resigned.
These events proved that the government was moving in the direction of
closer relation with the Axis, and that all who opposed this move were re
placed by others who favored the action of the government.
Some of the citizens of Argentina started protesting the aotion
of the government. About one hundred fifty prominent Argentinians signed
a declaration demanding effective democracy and loyal fulfillment of inter
national obligations. This declaration appeared in four Argentine newspa
pers on the morning of October 15, 1943.26 The government fought back,
and on October 16, President Ramirez discharged all government employees
27
who had signed the declaration of October 15. On November 10, the govern
ment established strict censorship over the press by organizing a department
of Information and Press, which was given power to regulate the activities
of the local press and foreign correspondents. On December 31, 1943, a de-
28
oree dissolving all political parties was issued.
Such was the condition in Argentina at the close of the eventful
year 1943. It appeared to have been a battle between the government on the
one hand and the people of the republic on the other, with the government
having the upper hand in the conflict.
24Ibid.
25|lFour Quit Cabinet in Argentine Crisis" Hew York Times, Octo
ber 14, 1943, p. 8L.
26
Goodrich and Carroll, op. olt.« VI, p. 524.
27
Ibid.
28"Argentina's Path" Hew York Times, January 2, 1944, p. 2E.
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During January 1944, there were several problems added to the
already troubled situation in Argentina. The Argentine Republic became
aware of the fact that the United States had definite proof that the Ra
mirez Government had encouraged and assisted in the recent revolution in
Bolivia, which had resulted in the overthrow of the government of that
country, and the installation of Major Villarroel as President. This
change occurred December 20, 1943, and the new government had issued a
statement to the effect that that government would remain aligned with
the United Nations and would still be governed by the inter-American
29
treaties and committments signed by the former government. Another
event, which added to the Argentine-Nazi complicity suspicion, held by
the United States and other Latin American nations, was the Osmar Helmuth
case (mentioned above).
Confronted with this embarrassing situation, the Argentine
Foreign Minister, Alberto Gilbert, told American Ambassador Armour, on
January 24, 1944, that Argentina would break off diplomatic relations
30
with the Axis in a few days. Finally on January 26, 1944, the following
telegrams were exchanged between President Ramirez and President Roosevelt:
... I have the honor to inform your Excellency that in
the exercise of Constitutional powers, I have proceeded to
sign the decree of breach of diplomatic"relations with the
Governments of Germany and Japan. ...
President Roosevelt's statement expressed his pleasure in learning of the
act:




Goodrich and Carroll, op. cit., VI, p. 536.
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• • .1 wish to express to your Excellency my pleasure
in learning of the decision of your Government te«,sever di
plomatic relations with Germany and Japan. . . .
Argentina, on February 4, 1944, issued a decree severing rela
tions with Bulgaria, Vichy France, Hungary and Rumania, but on February
15, a group of army officers took charge of the government, forced Presi
dent Ramirez to resign, and named General Edilmiro Farrell, the Vice
President, to take charge of the government. The American attitude toward
the Argentine situation was summed up by Acting Secretary of State Stetti-
nius on March 4, when he stated*
. . . Prior to February 25, the Argentine Government had
been headed by General Ramirez. On January 26, 1944, his
government broke off relations with the Axis and indicated
that it proposed to go further in cooperating. ... Sudden
ly on February 25, under well known circumstances, General
Ramirez abandoned the active conduct of affairs. This Govern
ment has reason to believe that groups not in sympathy with
the declared Apgentine policy. ... were active in this turn
of affairs.
The Department of State thereupon instructed Ambassador Ar
mour to refrain from entering official relations with the new
regime pending developments. This is the present status of
our relations with the existing Argentine regime*^3
United States Ambassador Norman Armour was instructed to return
to Washington for consultation June 27, 1944, and on July 26, Secretary
Hull issued to other Latin American governments a full length review of
the Argentine situation in which specific charges of collaboration with
the Axis were made. Hull stated that*
. . .At this most critical moment in the history of the
American Republics, the Government of one great Republic,
Argentina, has seen fit to take two steps whieh have result
ed in tremendous injury to the Allied cause, to wit: (1) it




sister republics to cooperate in support of the war against
the Axis powers, and in thus deserting the Allied cause has
struck a powerful blow at the whole system of hemispheric
cooperationj (2) it tetS openly and notoriously been giving
affirmative assistance to the declared enemies of the Uni
ted Nations. • •
Hull further charged the Farrell government with forcing President Ramir
ez to delegate his authority to the Farrell government, with setting free
Axis spies and agents arrested during the previous administration, and
with obtaining newsprint for the pro-Axis newspapers, with carried on
a bitter campaign against the United States. Hull eited an article
printed in a Buenos Aires newspaper, La Fronda, on the Allied landing
in France:
. . .It is most conforting that all the peoples of the
continent are closely grouped under the brilliant leader
ship of Hitler, who has been supernaturally transformed by
developments into ... more than an intrepid defender of
Germany, he is the defender of Europe.35
After the release of the Hull statement on the Argentine situa
tion, the Argentine Ambassador to the United Statts was called home by his
government.36 The Argentine gold stocks in the United States were frozen,
and on September 26, 1944, the State Department announced that merchant
ships would stop picking up northbound Argentine cargoes. The Hull charges
were denied by Argentina's Foreign Minister, Orlando Peluffo, and that
country withdrew from the Montevideo Committee for the Political Defense
of the Continent, whioh had been created at Rio de Janerio in 1942. The
Hull charges were admitted as being true by the Gabildo, a nationalist pa
per of Buenos Aires. That paper declared!




Hull, op. cit., II, p. 1402.
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... The Argentine Government since the time of Castillo
has been convinced of the necessity that Argentine voices
should be raised in defence of the principle of sovereignty
and has dedicated itself to the task of having newsprint man
ufactured for the Government's account, and selling it to
those organs that, being blacklisted, cannot purchase any di
rectly from Argentine factories.''
The July 26 statement of Secretary Hull caused a general break
down of the relations between the United States and Argentina as well as
between Argentina and the other American states. Argentina requested a
meeting of the foreign ministers so as to discuss the question with her
American neighbors, but the proposal was given a chilly reception by the
Governing Board of the Pan American Union. Argentina, angered by the
action of the Governing Board, severed her relations with the Pan Ameri-
can Union. The Governing Board at a later session (January 8, 1945)
voted to take up the Argentine question at the Conference scheduled for
March, 1945.
The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace con
vened at Mexico City, and six of the more important agreements reached
were given by Secretary of State Stettinius at the close of the session
March 8, 1945. These agreements were:
... First, we have reaffirmed our wartime collaboration
in the common struggle against the Axis. ... Second, after
full discussion the twenty American Republics have endorsed
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as a basis of the Charter for the
World Organization to be written at the United Nations Confer
ence in San Francisco. . • Third, in the Act of Chapultepee,
we have taken steps. . . in developing machinery for united
action. ... Fourth, the Mexico Conference has also adopted
sweeping and specific measures toward strengthening and reor
ganizing the inter-American system. ... Fifth, we have ded
icated ourselves. • • to American principles of humanity and
37"Argentina Helps Anti-United States Papers," Rev/ York Times,
September 18, 1944, p, 5C«
38
"Argentine Drops Participation in Pan American Union," New York
Times, January 11, 1945, p. 1.
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to raising the standards of living of our peoples. . . . Sixth,
every one of the twenty American Republics. . . has joined in
a resolution stating a united policy toward Argentina.*^
The Conference, in its Final Act, extended an invitation to the
Argentine Nation to adhere to the inter-American principles arrived at
during the Conference. Finally, on March 27, 1945, Argentina declared
war on the Axis and accepted the invitation to rejoin the American re-
40
publics. She signed the Act of Chapultepec April 4, 1945, and the
United States removed its special economic restrictions on trade imposed
during August and September, 1944. President Roosevelt, in what was per
haps his last act in connection with the "Good Neighbor" policy, appoint
ed Sprville Braden Ambassador to Argentina*
""Goodrich and Carroll, op. cit., VII, pp. 708-710.
40Ibid, p. 776.
SUMMARY
The American neighborhood in 1933 was filled with hatred, jeal
ousy, fear and suspicion. This condition was the aftermath of the events
of the period from 1898 to 1932. During that period, the smaller American
states had watched, helplessly, the large American state, the United
States, run roughshod over some of the smaller nations. The United States
controlled the destinies of all the nations around the Caribbean Sea. Am
erican financiers, backed by the United States Government, had taken charge
of the economic developments of these countries. The United States mighty
armed forces had intervened -whenever and wherever any activity on the part
of the nations concerned threatened to disrupt the activities of these in
vestors. Terms like "dollar diplomacy11 and the "big stick" became the bat
tle cry of these countries against the United States.
During the 1920's, the Latin American countries, led by Argentina,
began to speak out against intervention. Little by little, because of pub
lic sentiment at home and abroad, the United States began to relinquish the
economic and political control over the countries of Latin America. Into
this chain of events, came a new administration, a new theory, and a new
foreign policy - the "Good Neighbor" policy, as expressed by the new Pres
ident, Franklin Roosevelt. The United States took a definite stand against
intervention.
At the Montevideo Conference of 1933, the "Good Neighbor" policy
was initiated in the midst of widespread suspicion. However, most of the
nations of Latin America, inspired by the consistent statements and activ-
54
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ities of the President of the United States, changed their attitudes from
that of suspicion to that of outspoken cordiality. Among those not adher
ing to the benevolence expressed by the United States was Argentina. That
country believed that it should lead in the development of any inter-Ameri
can move toward cooperation. Argentina became the chronic obstructionist
to every effort of the United States toward inter-American cooperation.
This adverse attitude was shown at every inter-American Conference. The
United States yielded to the Argentine demands in favor of compromise ver
sions to every treaty, convention or protocol.
Because of the competition existing between the agricultural pro
ducts of the United States and Argentina, the two countries could not
reach any satisfactory agreement in respect to trade under the United States
Trade Agreements Act, passed by the Congress in 1934. In was not until
1941, that the two nations agreed to a trade agreement, which was not alto
gether satisfactory.
The relations between these two nations reached such a state dur
ing the war years that it became necessary to sever diplomatic relations.
Argentina appeared to have been the only Nazi outpost in the new world, and
was accused by the other American nations of complicity with the Axis pow
ers. She entered into secret agreements with the German Government during
the war years, but finally, when the Axis defeat was evident, rejoined the
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